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“NO TRESPASSING”:  RAILROAD LAND GRANTS,  
THE RIGHT OF EXCLUSION, AND THE ORIGINS OF 
FEDERAL FOREST CONSERVATION 
SEAN M. KAMMER* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Forest Management Act of 1897 established a management model 
for public lands that, for the most part, remains intact.  It embodies a 
balancing of control and conservation of forest resources such as timber, 
minerals, and forage with provisions for the exploitation of those resources 
for private gain.  This article explores the historical context in which this 
landmark legislation arose.  It examines the role of large railroad 
companies, particularly those that received extensive land subsidies, in first 
challenging the long-standing custom of timber as an open-access resource 
in the American West.  By enforcing their right of exclusion against timber 
trespassers in the court system, these railroad companies—while simply 
acting in their own pecuniary interest—helped effect a shift in natural 
resources policy from one emphasizing privatization and rapid development 
to one incorporating government ownership and centralized management.  
This article, however, illustrates the extent to which the allocation of 
resources can operate as a one-way ratchet.  It is all too easy to give nature 
away; it is not so easy to get it back. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The extent to which formal law has impeded the ability of the 
government to implement new federal public lands policies has been a 
recent theme of much literature on natural resources law.  Legal scholar 
Charles F. Wilkinson, for example, has blamed many of the contemporary 
problems in natural resources law on its origins in “the lords of yesterday,” 
a set of laws, policies, and ideas from another time.
1
  These “lords of 
yesterday,” in his account, include the notions of “first in time, first in 
 
1.  CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN:  LAND, WATER, AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE WEST xiii (1992). 
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right” for minerals, grazing land, and water, the construction of dams 
mainly for hydropower, and the establishment of logging as the dominant 
use of national forests.  They continue to shape current policy and legal 
debates despite the fact that they no longer align with the socio-economic 
values of westerners or with current scientific understandings.  Specifically, 
these pro-development policies are inconsistent with the broad consensus 
among westerners that, while resources should be developed, the pursuit of 
development should be, in Wilkinson’s words, “balanced and prudent, with 
precautions taken to ensure sustainability, to protect health, to recognize 
environmental values, to fulfill community values, and to provide a fair 
return to the public.”2  Wilkinson attributed the persistence of these 
outmoded laws and ideas to a number of factors, including the inherent 
inertia of legal and political doctrines, the power of lobbying forces, and a 
lack of public awareness, all of which have conspired to wall off natural 
resources law and policy behind a “shield of perceived complexity.”3 
Regarding the “lord of yesterday” governing the national forests, 
Wilkinson contended that this policy was achieved in a different manner 
than laws regarding mining, grazing, or water.  Whereas westerners 
informally fashioned their mining and grazing laws before Congress 
sanctioned them, Wilkinson argued that eastern conservationists were the 
primary movers behind federal timber policy.  In his account, the ideology 
and writings of Gifford Pinchot, the first head of the Forest Service 
beginning in 1905, are central to understanding how modern natural 
resources law came to be. Pinchot advocated the wise management of 
economic activities, including grazing and timber harvesting, within a 
system of national forests, all with the goal of ensuring both an equitable 
allocation of benefits in the present and a stable supply into the future.4  
These ideas indeed came to dominate public land management over the 
twentieth century.5 
This narrative, however, implies that some degree of consensus formed 
around Pinchot’s ideas and that Congress then imposed such ideas 
wholesale on communities in the West. My research suggests a far more 
complicated narrative.  The form of progressive conservation that Pinchot 
represented, as an intellectual movement, may have originated among 
professional elites in the East and in Europe.  However, the implementation 
of conservationist principles also required a confrontation with certain 
 
2.  Id.  at 17. 
3.  Id.  at xiii. 
4.  Id.  at 128-29; see also SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF 
EFFICIENCY:  THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 27-39 (1999). 
5.  HAYS, supra note 4, at 251. 
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assumptions that had shaped American attitudes toward—as well as the 
laws governing—natural resources from the seventeenth century to the end 
of the nineteenth century.  These assumptions included a belief in the 
abundance of un-owned land and natural resources, a belief that natural 
resources were limitless, and a corresponding belief that immediate use was 
best.  James Willard Hurst, commonly regarded as the founder of “new 
legal history,” detailed how these cultural assumptions were reflected in 
core principles of American law.  According to Hurst, the principle that 
society should promote the “release of creative human energy” by providing 
humans the greatest extent of freedom as possible permeated nineteenth 
century American law.6  This principle was reflected in the central tenet of 
nineteenth century public land law:  the preference for granting to 
individuals and companies the liberty and incentive to secure and develop 
natural resources as they saw fit and to bring the products of those resources 
to market.  It also contributed to the prevailing view of Americans towards 
all public resources, namely that they were freely available to the first 
person to make use of them.7 
Western railroads were among the most important of the economic 
actors with vested legal rights and economic interests established through 
application of the “release of creative energy” principle.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century, railroads had come to be seen not only as manifestations 
of the growth of corporate power in the United States, but also as 
representative of the federal government’s nineteenth century approach to 
public lands, the failures and corrupt implementation of that approach, and 
the apparent threat of resource depletion that resulted.8  Many saw railroads 
as the primary beneficiaries of the federal government’s nineteenth century 
public lands policy of converting the public domain into privately held 
property as rapidly and cheaply as feasible in order to stimulate economic 
development.9  Indeed, railroads were granted a substantial portion of the 
federal government’s public domain in the West.  Between 1850 and 1871, 
the federal government granted to railroads roughly 130 million acres, the 
 
6.  JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE  
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 6 (1956).  
7.  See generally Sean Kammer, Public Opinion is More than Law:  Popular Sovereignty and 
Vigilantism in the Nebraska Territory, 31 GREAT PLAINS Q. 309 (2011); George C. Coggins & 
Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II:  The Commons and 
the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1982). 
8.  See WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 122.  
9.  Wilkinson characterized the “main thrust” of such policies as being the desire “to transfer 
public resources into private hands on a wholesale basis in order to conquer nature.”  Id.  at 18. 
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vast majority of which was west of the Mississippi River.10  Partially due to 
these extensive land grants, railroad companies became some of the largest 
landowners in the country, as well as the largest owners of forests.  Indeed, 
two of the three largest owners of timberlands in the country were the 
Southern Pacific and the Northern Pacific, both of which received millions 
of acres of timberlands from the government.11 
It has become almost an axiom among legal scholars of natural 
resources law and policy that the various inconsistencies and inefficiencies 
embedded in current management regimes are the result of historical 
contingency rather than conscious design.  This article explores a key facet 
of that historical contingency: the role of railroads as owners of large tracts 
of heavily timbered lands interspersed with public and other private lands in 
bringing about modern federal forest management policies and laws.  The 
article begins in Section Two by outlining the extent to which a tradition of 
free resources permeated federal land policy and its often-lax 
administration, using Garret Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” model as 
its framework.  Then, Section Three explores the ironic role of railroad 
companies in confronting the tradition of free resources, even though they 
were prime beneficiaries of it.  Focusing primarily on the two largest 
railroad owners of timber, the Southern Pacific (largely through its 
subsidiary Oregon & California) and the Northern Pacific, it shows how 
these powerful corporations contributed to the demise of “open access” 
resources by enforcing their “right of exclusion,” a right attending 
ownership, even as they faced an uncertain legal terrain along the way.  
This was a necessary precondition for any effort at landscape-level land 
management and conservation—whether public or private.  Finally, Section 
Four shows how policymakers—first within the Departments of Interior and 
Agriculture, then within Congress—recognized the need to follow the lead 
of railroads in restricting access to certain areas of the public domain.  It 
was only after the government established its own “right of exclusion” 
through the establishment of forest reserves that management of such lands 
using conservationist principles became feasible, both practically and 
politically. 
 
10.  Id.  at 18.  This constituted almost one-tenth of the public domain as of 1850, when the 
extent of the public domain was at its peak and when the first railroad land grant was made.  Id.  at 
21-22. 
11.  Roy E. Appleman, Timber Empire from the Public Domain, 26 MISS. VALLEY HIST. 
REV. 205, 207 (1939).  
         
92 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:87 
II. THE TRAGEDY OF OPEN ACCESS TIMBER 
Lumber entrepreneurs Andrew B. Hammond and his business partner 
Richard Eddy had already cut most of the merchantable timber along the 
Clark Fork River in the mountains between Missoula and Helena, Montana 
by the summer of 1885, when their company, the Montana Improvement 
Company, established a new sawmill on the river to process timber from the 
tributary Cramer Gulch.12  Having arrived in Missoula just fifteen years 
earlier, Hammond had helped build Missoula into a “thriving city of five 
thousand” while also building himself into one of the state’s wealthiest, and 
hence, most powerful people.13  Hammond and Eddy, along with E.L. 
Bonner, formed a merchandising firm in Missoula nine years earlier, and in 
1881, that company entered into a contract to supply the Northern Pacific 
with lumber for ties and other materials, despite the company lacking 
construction experience.  Just a year later, in 1882, Hammond, Eddy, and 
Bonner joined with Montana copper magnate Marcus Daly and Washington 
Dunn, the Northern Pacific’s superintendent of construction, to form the 
Montana Improvement Company.14  Because Dunn and other Northern 
Pacific officials held a bare majority of the shares, people thought of the 
company as a Northern Pacific subsidiary, though nobody was acting in that 
company’s interests.15  Upon its creation, the Montana Improvement 
Company received a twenty-year contract to supply the railroad’s lumber 
needs for construction and maintenance of the railway from Miles City, 
Montana to The Dalles, Oregon.16 
When Hammond and Eddy arrived at their new Cramer Gulch mill in 
the fall of 1885, however, they were surprised to encounter some fifty 
loggers, all employees of rival Bill Thompson, on the site cutting down 
trees.17  Fights ensued, but ownership of the timber remained unresolved.  
As the situation worsened, the parties even violated the custom of 
respecting at least the rights of others to trees properly branded.18  They 
eventually reached a compromise to honor that custom, but with neither 
having the exclusive rights to any unbranded timber.19  It thus became a 
 
12.  Gregory Gordon, Money Does Grow on Trees 172-74 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Montana).   
13.  Id.  at 21. 
14.  Id.  at 189. 
15.  See id. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id.  at 172. 
18.  As historian Gregory Gordon summarized the situation, “[w]ith no clear-cut demarcation 
of ownership, total mayhem broke out.”  Id.  at 173. 
19.  Id. 
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race as to who could log the fastest.20  As a result, “there were few gulches 
in Montana,” historian Gregory Gordon has concluded, “which were 
stripped of their timber faster than was Cramer Gulch that winter [of 
1886].”21 
A. “TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS” EXPLAINED 
The above story exemplifies what economist Garrett Hardin labeled the 
“tragedy of the commons.”22  Wherever there is lacking an ownership 
system that functions to limit access to and consumption of a given 
resource, Hardin wrote in his influential 1968 essay, each member of the 
community is “locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
[consumption of the resource] without limit—in a world that is limited. 
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own 
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.”23  
Some have mistakenly explained the tragedy as the failure for individuals to 
see community interests over their own self-interests.24  No, the story is a 
tragedy rather than merely an unfortunate occurrence because even when an 
individual recognizes the “ruin” towards which the community is headed, 
and even if that individual values community interests, that person will still 
over-exploit the resource absent some coercive mechanism to restrict the 
access of others.  The reason is that if he were to forego exploitation based 
on concern for long-term sustainability, he knows that others will still  
 
20.  Id.  at 173-74. 
21.  Id.  at 174 (internal citation omitted).  Gordon rightly pointed to this story, which 
repeated itself across the Northwest, as representing the battle among the federal government, 
private capital, and local residents over natural resources, but Gordon wrongfully pointed to it as 
an example of the right to access.  Really, neither contested the other’s right to access because 
neither had the right to exclude—and it was that right which was crucial.  
22.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
23.  Id.  at 1244.  In economic terms, the “tragedy” is an example of a market failure.  As 
Arthur McEvoy described the failure, “[i]n a competitive economy, no market mechanism 
ordinarily exists to reward individual forbearance in the use of shared resources.” ARTHUR F. 
MCEVOY, THE FISHERMAN’S PROBLEM:  ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 
1850-1980 10 (1990). 
24.  See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Markets and Beyond:  Three Modest 
Proposals for the Future of Environmental Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245, 250 (2001) (arguing that 
Hardin’s tragedy results “because each individual is only concerned about the potential for selfish 
gain from the additional cow and pays no attention to the potential disaster looming for the 
community as a whole”); E. Donald Elliott, The Tragi-Comedy of the Commons:  Evolutionary 
Biology, Economics and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17, 17 (2001) (criticizing 
Hardin’s apparent view of humans as “narrow-minded and selfish”); Lee Anne Fennell, Common 
Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 915 (2004) (conceptualizing the tragedy as “the 
resource-appropriator . . . not taking all the costs of her appropriation into account”); Michael Ilg, 
Environmental Harm and Dilemmas of Self-Interest:  Does International Law Exhibit Collective 
Learning?, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 59, 62 (2004) (using Hardin’s model as an explanation for how 
“individual perceptions of interest rarely result in decisions that are most beneficial to the 
whole . . . .”). 
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over-exploit the resource, causing him to suffer along with everyone else 
but without the incremental benefit he would have derived from having 
fully exploited the resource.  The only rational choice is to get what he can 
before the others do, even if it destroys the resource. Hardin proffered two 
solutions to the “tragedy”:  to restrict access through the vigilance of the 
community as a whole—“mutual coercion mutually agreed upon”—or to 
privatize the resource so that each private owner has the capacity to exclude 
others.25 
What Hardin labeled a “tragedy of the commons” was really a tragedy 
of open-access resources, of non-property, or of an unregulated commons.  
In the Anglo-American common law tradition, the terms “commons” or 
“common property,” on their own, normally imply some form of communal 
control over access and use.26  In short, they embody precisely the “mutual 
coercion” that Hardin pointed to as the solution to the tragedy—not the 
tragedy itself.  For example, beginning as early as the seventh century, 
settlements in what is now England employed a system of common fields, 
meadows, and pastures, all with limitations on use.  After the Norman 
Conquest in 1066, communities increasingly regulated who had access to 
certain lands and the manner of their use, including the enactment of quotas 
on the amount of livestock allowed to graze on a given pasture.27  Much 
later, English colonists exported such customs to communities from New 
Brunswick to Virginia.28  By the nineteenth century, however, many 
Americans had come to view the “commons” differently, and in conflating 
“commons” with “open-access,” Hardin unwittingly aligned himself with 
nineteenth century American thinking.29 
B. CUSTOM OF FREE LAND, FREE TIMBER 
Hammond, Eddy, Thompson and others all across the American West 
largely viewed timber as an open-access resource—at least prior to the 
government privatizing it.  The notion of public timber being free for the 
taking was not just one of extra-legal, local custom; it had its defenders in 
 
25.  Hardin, supra note 22, at 1247.  
26.  See DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY:  COMPARING OWNERSHIP 
INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 11 (2002); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional 
Framework for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 816-17 (2003); 
Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 533, 533 (2007). 
27.  Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept:  An Historical Concept with Modern 
Relevance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 853-54 (1982); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 
102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1388-90 (1993). 
28.  Butler, supra note 27, at 867-75. 
29.  See generally Hardin, supra note 22. 
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Congress as well.  For some in Congress, open-access was even an 
important component of the American constitutional tradition:  exclusion 
was for monarchies, open access for democracies.  In 1826, for instance, 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton admonished his fellow senators that they were 
“an assembly of legislators” rather than “keeper[s] of the King’s forests.”30  
As representatives of the people, surely they all understood, Benton 
implored, that “the public lands belong to the People, and not to the Federal 
Government; who know that the lands are to be ‘disposed of’ for the 
common good of all, and not kept for the service of a few.”31  Then, in 
1852, when agents of the General Land Office (“GLO”), the agency 
charged with administering federal public lands, seized timber illegally cut 
from public lands in Wisconsin, a representative from that state, Ben 
Eastman, insisted that the agents were acting “without the least authority of 
law.”32  He even complained that lumbermen had been “harassed almost 
beyond endurance with pretended seizures and suits, prosecutions and 
indictments until they have been driven almost to the desperation of an 
open revolt against their persecutors.”33 
That same year, Representative Galusha Grow, from Pennsylvania, 
defended the rights of every person to share in the federal government’s 
supply of timber: 
[W]hatever nature has provided . . . belongs alike to the whole 
race, and each may, of right, appropriate to his own use so much as 
is necessary to supply his rational wants.  And as the means of 
sustaining life are derived almost entirely from the soil, every 
person has a right to so much of the earth’s surface as is necessary 
for his support . . . .  As it is man’s labor, then, applied to the soil 
that gives him a right to his improvements . . . so he is entitled to a 
reasonable quantity of wood-land, it being necessary to the full 
enjoyment of his improvements; for wood is necessary for 
building purposes, fencing, and fire-wood.  Therefore, he becomes 
entitled out of this common fund to a reasonable amount of  
wood-land.34 
As these quotes demonstrate, Americans viewed more than just timber 
as an open-access resource.  As Greeley once remarked, “free timber” was 
merely one part of the American “free land” tradition represented in the 
 
30.  19 CONG. REC. 727 (1826) (statement of Sen. Thomas Benton). 
31.  Id. 
32.  Gordon, supra note 12, at 183. 
33.  See id. 
34.   CONG. GLOBE APPENDIX, 32D CONG., 1ST SESS. 426 (1852). 
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preemption and homestead laws.35  Preemption laws, the most significant of 
which Congress passed in 1841, provided for qualified persons to acquire 
legal title for up to 160 acres by inhabiting and improving the land and 
paying $1.25 per acre.36  The law applied retroactively to validate the 
claims of people who had previously settled land, even without legal right.37  
Passed in 1862, the Homestead Act expanded upon the preemption laws by 
providing settlers the option of securing lands for free simply by living on 
the land for five years and cultivating it.38  Greeley might have added to that 
list of laws the nation’s mining laws—which declared public lands to be 
“free and open” to mineral exploration and development—and its lack of 
restrictions on the use of public rangelands.39  As late as 1884, a 
congressional committee charged with reviewing the nation’s land laws 
found cattlemen to be illegally holding roughly fifteen million acres of the 
public domain, yet it also acknowledged the government lacked any legal 
mechanism for prosecuting the trespasses.40  Indeed, the term “public 
lands” itself came to be understood not as those lands in governmental 
ownership, but only as those lands free and open for the American public to 
enter and to acquire.41 
C. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S INADEQUATE EFFORT TO 
 CONTROL DEPREDATIONS 
To a limited extent, the government did assert control of resources 
prior to privatization.  It dictated who could have access to what resources 
and defined the conditions by which parcels could be privatized, even if 
such conditions were minimal.  The Preemption Act of 1841, for example, 
allowed only heads of families, widows, or single men to settle lands and 
 
35.  See Robert Bunting, Abundance and the Forests of the Douglas-Fir Bioregion, 1840-
1920, 18 ENVTL. HIST. REV. 41, 45 (1994).  In 1807, Congress passed an act “[t]o prevent 
settlements being made on lands ceded to the United States, until authorized by law.”  Act of 
March 3, 1807, 2 Stat. 445.  However, the Preemption Law of 1841 recognized the rights of those 
who had settled (or squatted) on government land, even in violation of law.  Preemption Act of 
1841, 5 Stat. 453. 
36.  Id.  at § 9. 
37.  Id.  at § 10. 
38.  Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, § 2, 12 Stat. 392. 
39.  Act of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91. 
40.  See generally Joseph Arthur Miller, Congress and the Origins of Conservation:  Natural 
Resource Policies, 1865-1900 203 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of 
Minnesota).  The government could have brought civil actions under a common law trespass 
theory, but that would have required the government to describe the affected lands to a level of 
specificity that would have been nearly impossible. 
41.  For a discussion of the defense of free timber in Congress, at least for the purposes of 
settlement, see PAUL WALLACE GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 538-40 
(1968).  
         
2014] NO TRESPASSING 97 
ultimately secure legal title, and it limited the size of tracts to 160 acres.42  
It also required settlers to follow several steps.  After inhabiting and 
improving particular parcels, qualified settlers had thirty days to file a 
declaration of intent to preempt, and they had a year to prove the settlement 
and improvement, to submit an affidavit testifying that they met all of the 
requirements of the act, and to pay $1.25 per acre.43
  
However, from the 
start, these restrictions were frequently violated, sometimes with the 
backing of extra-legal, vigilante organizations known informally as “claim 
clubs.”44 
Such a development was foreseeable.  In the debates over the 
preemption law in 1841, in fact, Senator Henry Clay predicted that the 
federal government would not be able to control the lawless rabble that he 
said would settle lands ahead of surveys.  Clay’s warning, however, went 
unheeded, and at great expense.  Thirty years later, Henry George lamented 
the extent to which speculators had exploited the land laws to benefit 
themselves at the expense of the public: 
A generation hence our children will look with astonishment at the 
recklessness with which the public domain has been squandered.  
It will seem to them that we must have been mad . . . to every 
importunate beggar to whom we would have refused money we 
have given land—that is, we have given to him or to them the 
privilege of taxing the people who alone would put this land to any 
use.45 
The Homestead law contained similar restrictions and requirements, 
but they too were often circumvented.46  One prominent public lands 
historian has written that speculation and land monopolization—in part 
executed via fraudulent homestead entries—characterized the homesteading 
era, with “actual homesteading [being] generally confined to the less 
desirable lands distant from railroad lines.”47  Commissioner of the GLO, 
William A. J. Sparks, complained in 1885 that the Homestead Act, “both in 
Washington and in the field, was frequently in the hands of persons 
unsympathetic to its principle” and that “Western interests, though lauding 
 
42.  The Preemption Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 453. 
43.  Id. 
44.  See generally Kammer, supra note 7, at 310. 
45.  HENRY GEORGE, OUR LAND AND LAND POLICY, NATIONAL AND STATE 10 (1871).  His 
work was instrumental in ending the railroad land grant era.  But much of the actual privatization 
of land under the land grants was still in the future, subject to legal interpretation, of course. 
46.  Act of May 20, 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392. 
47.  Paul Wallace Gates, The Homestead Law in an Incongruous Land System, 41 AM. HIST. 
REV. 652, 655 (1936). 
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the act, were ever ready to pervert it.”48  In his memoir, Pinchot described 
one method for circumventing the Homestead Act’s requirements: 
The law required a dwelling on a homestead claim.  So the 
claimant would build a toy house, swear to the existence of a 
dwelling on his claim ‘14 by 16 in size,’ but omit to mention that 
the said dwelling was 14 by 16 inches instead of 14 by 16 feet.49 
The federal government also passed laws prohibiting the unauthorized 
taking of timber from public lands.  Congress enacted the first in 1817, 
when it allowed the Secretary of Navy to reserve timberlands for 
shipbuilding and enacted penalties for the unauthorized taking of timber 
from such forests.50  Then, in 1831, Congress expanded the prohibition to 
all public lands.51  These pieces of legislation, however, went largely 
unenforced.  The GLO only began prosecuting timber trespass in 1852.52  
Even then, the government’s prosecutions were sporadic, and its policies 
focused not on preventing illegal timber harvests, but rather merely on 
ensuring the government received the value of the trees illegally cut.  
Commissioner of the GLO, Willis Drummond, reported to Congress in 
1873, for instance, that when registers and receivers obtained reliable 
information that “spoliation of public timber is committed, their instructions 
require them to investigate the matter, to seize all timber found to have been 
cut without authority on the public land, to sell the same to the highest 
bidder at public auction, and deposit the proceeds in the Treasury.”53  While 
Drummond increased prosecutions, he emphasized that their purpose was 
“not to indulge in vindictive prosecutions.”54  Instead, he advised 
prosecutors “to compromise with the parties” to pay only a reasonable price 
for the stumpage plus the government’s costs in bringing suit.55  By merely 
fining trespassers for the value of the timber taken, the federal government 
ignored the negative impact of the timber harvest on the land’s future 
productivity.  This is why Hurst saw this approach as yet another example 
of the legal system’s preference for present over future yield, a preference 
that resulted from the perceived abundance of land and resources and 
 
48.  Id.  at 655-56. 
49.  GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 81 (rev. ed. 1987).  
50.  Gordon, supra note 12, at 181.  
51.  Id.  
52.  See id.  at 182-185. 
53.  DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GEN. LAND OFFICE 13 
(1873). 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id.  See also GATES, supra note 41, at 545-57 (discussing federal policies towards 
protecting federal timber from 1873 to 1885, when the Cleveland Administration reformed the 
Land Department and more aggressively acted to protect the public domain from depredations). 
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perceived shortage of capital.56  It also contributed to countless timber 
“tragedies,” at least on the local scale, as Hurst’s history of the Wisconsin 
lumber industry demonstrates.57 
III. THE ROLE OF RAILROADS IN COMBATING TRAGEDY 
Railroads initially exacerbated such tragedies by creating demand for 
timber and by linking timber to distant markets.  They stimulated timber 
demand both because they required timber for railroad construction and 
because they made industrial-scale mining—requiring large amounts of 
timber—feasible.  In the Missoula Valley for instance, sawmills remained 
small-scale water-powered mills, intended only to supply lumber for 
immediate local consumption, until the arrival of the Northern Pacific, 
when railroad contracts allowed Hammond and others to build dozens of 
steam-powered mills to supply railroad construction and the burgeoning 
mining industry such railroads made possible.58  Railroads also participated, 
typically through “improvement company” subsidiaries, in the trespasses 
themselves, as the Northern Pacific’s relationship with Hammond’s 
Montana Improvement Company exemplifies.59 
However, railroads can also be seen as having helped save American 
forests from tragedy, at least on a national scale.  Environmental historian 
Robert Bunting, for one, has argued that the acquisition of extensive timber 
holdings by powerful corporations like the Northern Pacific led to a decline 
in timber trespasses in the Pacific Northwest.60  One reason is that railroads 
possessed the motivation to enforce rights as to which the government had 
long been indifferent: the right to exclude others.  The Supreme Court has 
referred to this right as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property.”61  The right to exclude 
 
56.  See James A. Lake, Sr., Law and Economic Growth:  The Legal History of the Lumber 
Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915, 17 ME. L. REV. 298 (1964) (reviewing JAMES W. HURST, LAW 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1964)) (explaining that railroad land grants were also a manifestation 
of this preference). 
57.  See id. 
58.  Gordon, supra note 12, at 181-82. 
59.  John B. Rae, Commissioner Sparks and the Railroad Land Grants, 25 MISS. VALLEY 
HIST. REV. 211, 217 (1938) (labeling the Northern Pacific as apparently “the worst offender”). 
60.  Bunting, supra note 35, at 41. 
61.  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).  Writing for the majority in a 1979 case, Justice Rehnquist went 
even further in concluding that the right to exclude was not only the most important component of 
property, but “fundamental” to it.  Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 179-80.  Legal scholars have largely agreed, 
arguing that “the right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the 
existence of property,” such that the right to exclude is “fundamental to the concept of property” 
itself, and concluding that “property means the right to exclude others from valued resources, no 
more and no less.”  Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 
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is indeed the reason that Hardin advocated privatization as one of the two 
solutions to the tragedy of the commons.62  Whereas the federal 
government, at least until the latter part of the nineteenth century, lacked the 
combination of will and means to enforce its right of exclusion, railroads 
had both a pecuniary incentive to protect their resources and staffs of 
investigators and attorneys to do so. 
A. ESTABLISHING A RIGHT OF EXCLUSION 
That railroads were both willing and able to enforce their rights of 
exclusion is perhaps best demonstrated by the great number of land contests 
and ejectment actions—both legal mechanisms for enforcing an 
exclusionary right—railroads initiated.  Railroads became embroiled in 
litigation over the nature and extent of their rights to particular tracts of land 
as against the rights of preemptors, homesteaders, mining claimants, 
Indians, federal and state governments, and other railroads.  Indeed, no 
public lands legislation produced more litigation than railroad land grants.  
The Northern Pacific, on its own, was a party to over three-thousand formal 
legal disputes involving its land grant.63 
The approach of another railroad, the Oregon & California, was 
typical.  Upon having a selection list approved and receiving patents to 
sections of land, the company first made its possession of lands clear to all 
would-be settlers, both by recording its patents in the various counties in 
which the lands lay and by keeping on record its approved selection lists 
and patents issued by the government.  The company also established its 
ownership by paying taxes on such lands.64  When the company found a 
party occupying a parcel of its unsold lands, it sent agents to ascertain the 
 
755 (1998). James E. Penner, in THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW, argued that “the right to 
property is a right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the 
use of things.”  JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997).  While the right is 
grounded in the owner’s use of the thing, “the law of property is driven by an analysis which takes 
the perspective of exclusion, rather than one which elaborates a right to use.”  Id. But see, Jerry L. 
Anderson, Comparative Perspectives on Property Rights:  The Right to Exclude, 56 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 539, 541 (2006) (questioning the essentialness of exclusion by pointing to property regimes 
outside of the English common law tradition that have implemented property regimes that 
incorporate public rights of access). 
62.  Of course, private property holders can also over-exploit a resource, especially in 
situations where their individual fortunes are not tied to the sustainability of either that resource or 
the local communities dependent upon it.  For instance, lumbermen could over-exploit the forests 
of the upper Great Lake region because they knew more timber was available in the Pacific 
Northwest, such that their fortunes were not tied to Great Lakes timber or to the local communities 
built up to exploit it. 
63.  Docket, 1885-1899, Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records, Land Dep’t Records, Land 
Cases, Box 136.G.14.8F, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint Paul, MN. 
64.  Transcript of Record at 2202, Or. & Cal. Ry. v. United States, 238 U.S. 393 (1916) (No. 
492). 
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situation and to determine the rights, if any, of the possible trespassers to 
the land.  If the person was indeed without legal right to occupy the land, 
the company asserted its ownership and demanded that the party either take 
a lease on the land or vacate it.  If the individual refused, the company then 
filed an ejectment suit to force them from the land.65  The company also 
took efforts to prevent depredations, destruction, or waste of timber by 
persons not entitled to it by law.66 
In the case of the Northern Pacific, wherever the company suspected 
timber trespasses, the company’s land commissioner sent out an 
investigator to gather information as to any past transgressions and to 
prevent future transgressions.  That person then reported to the land office, 
which then referred any prosecutable trespasses to the Western Land 
Attorney with a directive to settle for the amount cut.  The Northern Pacific 
typically demanded a settlement amount far above market value.67  In late 
1896, for instance, a Northern Pacific investigator, Charles E. Woodworth, 
notified the sheriff of Missoula County, William H. McLaughlin, that he 
was responsible for taking timber from Northern Pacific lands. Frank M. 
Dudley, the Northern Pacific’s Western Land Attorney in Spokane, 
Washington, later followed up with McLaughlin demanding settlement at 
$1.50 per thousand board feet unlawfully cut.68  The sheriff responded by 
requesting both an extension of time and for the amount to be lowered to 
one dollar.  As to the need for an extension, he confessed that he was 
“unable to pay just now” and needed until May or June of the following 
year, the reason being that his lumber mill was seasonal—it had shut down 
on October 1 and would not reopen until spring.  As for the price 
demanded, McLaughlin considered it “out of all reason the way lumber is 
selling and was selling when the timber was cut.”69  He stated that he would 
be “perfectly willing to pay the going price for timber,” which he estimated 
at $1.00 per thousand board feet, based primarily on the price for processed 
lumber at the railway car being less than $6.00.  He finished with a plea: 
“Hoping you will consider the price of timber very carefully.”70  What 
 
65.  Id.  at 2203.  The company made “a good many leases” of lands for grazing purposes, 
according to land official Brian A. McAllaster; in many of these cases, the company’s purpose 
was to prevent the statute of limitations running against the company by virtue of the occupancy.  
Id.  at 1980-81. 
66.  Id.  at 2203. 
67.  See generally Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records, Law Dep’t Records, Land 
Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 22, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint Paul, MN. 
68.  Letter from McLaughlin to Dudley (December 21, 1896), Northern Pacific Railway Co. 
Records, Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 22, Minnesota Historical 
Society, Saint Paul, MN.  
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
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McLaughlin sought, in short, was to pay the market value for the timber 
without paying anything for violating the Northern Pacific’s right of 
exclusion. 
In its reply, the railroad made clear it wanted redress not just for the 
value of the timber taken, but also for being deprived its right of exclusion.  
First, Dudley forwarded McLaughlin’s letter to Land Commissioner 
William H. Phipps with a request for instructions on how to proceed.  In 
reply, Phipps acknowledged the rate of $1.50 per thousand board feet to be 
high, but he emphasized that such was intentional: he sought “to make it 
unprofitable for people to cut our timber without authority.”71  Unlike the 
federal government, the Northern Pacific recognized that its property rights 
entitled it not just to the market value of commodities on the land, but also 
to decide how and when they were to be extracted and to determine who 
would receive the benefits from such use.  Moreover, it perhaps also 
recognized that the value of the property was not just in its present value, 
but also in its future productivity.  Still, Phipps authorized Dudley to settle 
for $1.25 per thousand board feet, an amount splitting the difference 
between the railroad’s initial demand and McLaughlin’s estimated market 
value.  As to the extension of time, Phipps thought that was fine, so long as 
the railroad received sufficient security.72 
B. LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES AS OBSTACLES TO EXCLUSION 
Economists understand Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” as an 
example of a “market failure,” meaning that the market has failed to 
maximize efficiency—an economic term of art essentially serving as a 
proxy for “satisfaction” or “enjoyment.”73  Types of market failure include 
externalities—i.e., costs or benefits not borne by parties to a transaction—
transaction costs, imperfect competition, and a lack of clearly defined 
property rights.74  While the federal government provided for the 
privatization of much of its public domain, it left much ambiguity in the 
definition of the resulting property rights.  This was in part due to the sheer 
number of land laws, as Congress passed roughly 3,500 such laws between 
 
71.  Letter from Phipps to Dudley (January 2, 1897), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records, 
Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 22, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint 
Paul, MN.  
72.  Id. 
73.  For a good discussion of the tragedy as an example of a market failure, see JAN G. 
LAITOS, SANDI B. ZELLMER & MARY C. WOOD, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, 18-21 (2d ed. 
2012). 
74.  Id. 
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1785 and 1880.75  It was not just the immense number of laws passed, 
however, but also their lack of precision and consistency as to the rights of 
grantees that led to confusion.  The nation’s land laws, in historian Paul 
Wallace Gates’ summation, created an incongruous land system, one with 
sometimes dire consequences for those caught within it.76  Indeed, in 1887, 
Secretary of the Interior Lucious Q. C. Lamar expressed pity for settlers 
who could “scarcely find a desirable location that was not claimed by some 
one, or perhaps two or three, of the many roads to which grants of land had 
been made by Congress.”77 
Railroad land grants, even on their own, were highly complex and 
difficult to administer.  First, railroads typically received only alternating 
sections of land, creating a “checkerboard” of sorts across the American 
landscape.  While this may seem simple, delays in cadastral surveys 
allowed for conflicting claims to arise and for property rights to remain 
unsettled.78  Second, land grants typically excepted lands containing 
minerals other than coal or iron from grants.  This too may seem simple but, 
in fact, led to uncertainties due to long delays in physical surveys.79  
Finally, Congress did not actually grant any land but rather provided the 
procedures by which railroads could acquire the designated lands.  There 
were multiple steps involved.  The first was for the grant recipients to file 
maps of the projected general routes of their roads with the Department of 
Interior, after which the president was directed to have the lands along such 
routes surveyed.80  Most also contained provisions directing the GLO, upon 
general location, to withdraw granted lands from disposal under the public 
land laws.81  Then, as each portion of the prescribed railway was built, 
recipient railway companies filed maps of definite location showing the 
precise line of the constructed railway.82 
At that point, Congress expected that railroad companies would file 
selection lists, and the appropriate lands would be patented to the railroad 
companies to be sold to the general public to great benefit.83  Congress also 
 
75.  Vernon Carstensen, Introduction to THE PUBLIC LANDS:  STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF 
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN xxii (Carstensen ed. 1963). 
76.  See generally GATES, supra note 41. 
77.  David M. Ellis, The Forfeiture of Railroad Land Grants, 1867-1894, 33 MISS. VALLEY 
HIST. REV. 27, 33 (1946).  
78.  See infra text accompanying note 94. 
79.  See infra text accompanying notes 94-101. 
80.  Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 369. 
81.  Id.; Act of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 239; Act of May 4, 1870, 16 Stat. 94. 
82.  Act of May 4, 1870, 16 Stat. 94. 
83.  See Ellis, supra note 77, at 30. 
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anticipated the railways to be completed within ten years.84  In truth, neither 
occurred. Both the construction of railways and the subsequent patenting of 
lands were delayed for decades.  The Northern Pacific, for instance, did not 
complete its line from Duluth, Minnesota to Tacoma, Washington until 
1887, twenty-three years after it received its grant and a full thirteen years 
past its original deadline.85  Further, despite its construction being gradual, 
it had patented less than a million acres of its estimated forty-seven million 
acre grant by that time.86  While this was probably at least partly due to 
railroads delaying their applications for lands so as to avoid paying taxes,87 
it was also due to the GLO being overworked.88 
Because so much of the land grants remained unpatented for so long, 
railroad companies were compelled to develop policies on how to protect 
their future interests to land not yet patented to them.  All the while, their 
legal rights—including their rights of exclusion—remained in a sort of legal 
limbo.  Indeed, the sheer number of legal disputes involving the Northern 
Pacific and other railroads and their claims to land evidences not just a 
dedication on their part to enforcing their exclusionary rights, but also a 
great deal of legal uncertainty.  In short, parties do not expend the time and 
money in litigation unless either the facts or the law are uncertain; 
otherwise, they would settle.89  Legal uncertainties remained even to the 
turn of the century, as indicated below. 
1. The Problem of Too Many Trespassers 
Because railroad construction was a primary impetus for timber 
trespasses, the Northern Pacific sometimes caught people cutting timber for 
the purposes of selling it to another railroad, just as the Northern Pacific 
sometimes purchased timber stolen from another’s land.  In the spring of 
1897, for example, a railroad investigator discovered piles of ties in 
multiple locations along the Montana-Idaho border.  He soon concluded 
that the ties were taken from within the limits of the Northern Pacific’s land 
grant and that such ties were earmarked for use on the competing Great 
Northern line.  Upon the investigator reporting the matter to the Land 
Department, Land Commissioner Phipps sought the advice of Dudley, who 
 
84.  Id. 
85.  Leslie E. Decker, The Railroads and the Land Office:  Administrative Policy and the 
Land Patent Controversy, 1864-1896, 46 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 688, 695 (1960). 
86.  Id. 
87.  Transcript of Record, supra note 64, at 2213. 
88.  See Harold H. Dunham, Some Crucial Years of the General Land Office, 1875-1890, 11 
AGRIC. HIST. 117, 118 (1937). 
89.  See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
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directed that the company wait for the Great Northern to inspect and accept 
the ties before calling its attention to the Northern Pacific’s claims.90  The 
reason was simple:  if the Northern Pacific were to sue prior to the other 
railroad’s acceptance, it would have to proceed against each of the 
individual trespassers, possibly entangling the company in twenty or more 
lawsuits.91  Though not made explicit, that the Great Northern had deeper 
pockets then small-scale timber operators likely played a role as well.92 
2. The Problem of Unsurveyed Lands 
Another issue confronting the company in this case was that the ties 
had been taken from lands not yet surveyed.  Because there were not yet 
specific parcels of land to which the Northern Pacific could point where its 
future interests had been violated, the Northern Pacific could not technically 
sue the Great Northern. Rather, that obligation fell to the United States 
Department of Justice.  As in other cases, the Northern Pacific notified the 
U.S. district attorney and solicited his agreement to bring suit for the 
trespasses.93  The agreement called for the Northern Pacific to draft the 
complaint and otherwise aid in the prosecution; in exchange, the district 
attorney agreed to give half of the suit’s proceeds to the company.94 
Lands remaining unsurveyed for so long was especially difficult given 
the exclusion of mineral lands from railroad grants.95  The Supreme Court 
compounded the uncertainty in 1894 when it held the exclusion of mineral 
lands to include those lands unknown to contain minerals at the time of the 
route being fixed, so long as minerals were discovered prior to patent.96  
That case involved land in western Montana on the outskirts of Helena.  
The railroad fixed the definite route through that area in 1882, at which time 
nobody knew the land at issue contained minerals.  Six years later, 
however, a group of four men entered the land without the consent of the 
 
90.  Letter from Dudley to Phipps (March 2, 1897), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records, 
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93.  Letter from Dudley to Phipps (April 16, 1897), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records, 
Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 22, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint 
Paul, MN.  
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96.  See Barden v. N. Pac. R. Co., 154 U.S. 288, 321 (1894). 
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railroad and located quartz lode mining claims on it.  They subsequently 
discovered gold, silver, and other precious minerals on their claims.  The 
Northern Pacific then asserted its right of exclusion by filing a complaint in 
federal court for the recovery of the possession of the land, for the value of 
minerals extracted, and for the costs associated with the litigation.97  The 
railroad’s attorneys insisted that the grant’s exclusion of mineral lands 
applied only to those known to contain minerals as of the date of definite 
location or to those the railroad identified as mineral in its definite location. 
Writing for the Supreme Court’s majority, Justice Stephen Field 
rejected the railroad’s argument.  He first made a formalistic statutory 
construction argument.  He reasoned that the company’s position amounted 
to adding the word “known” into the statute, something he was unwilling to 
do.  As he interpreted the plain meaning of the land grant, “the intention of 
[C]ongress was to exclude from the grant actual mineral lands, whether 
known or unknown, and not merely such as were at the time known to be 
mineral.”98  Field then offered an additional rationalization for his opinion, 
this one relating to the policies behind the land grants.  He first noted that 
when Congress passed the land grant, it was impossible to know what parts 
of the vast tract contained minerals; rather, the mineral character of lands 
“could only be ascertained after extensive and careful explorations.”99  He 
then surmised: 
“it is not reasonable to suppose that Congress would have left that 
important fact [as to the mineral character of the lands] dependent 
upon the simple designation by the [Northern Pacific] of the line 
of its road, and the possible disclosure of minerals by the way, 
instead of leaving it to future and special explorations for their 
discovery.”100 
Such a reading of the statute, according to Field, would amount to an 
imputation to Congress that it intended its exclusion of minerals to be 
defeated, something that Field found “impossible to admit.”101  To Field, 
those “future and special explorations” were to take place as part of the 
GLO’s investigation prior to issuing patents.  Once the government issued 
patents to the railroad, they were final and determinative absent fraud.102 
The Court’s holding had the practical effect of calling into question the 
right of exclusion of railroad land grant recipients, including the Northern 
 
97.  Id.  at 293 
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Pacific, prior to patent, at least as to those entering lands to explore for 
minerals.  That was especially the case given that private entry and 
exploration was still the primary legal mechanism for the government to 
identify which lands contained minerals, and hence which lands were 
excluded from railroad land grants.  At the very least, railroads could no 
longer eject an alleged “trespasser” once a discovery of minerals had been 
made. Since many years, if not decades, typically passed between the 
definite location of the railway’s route and patenting, this was quite a 
troubling development for the Northern Pacific and other land grant 
railroads. 
Another problem was that the GLO had neither the means nor the 
explicit legal authority to investigate lands as to their mineral character—as 
the Court seemingly assumed it did—prior to issuing patents.  The Court’s 
opinion spurred Congress to action, however, as not even a year passed 
before Congress, in early 1895, directed the president to appoint three 
commissioners for each of four designated districts in western Montana and 
Idaho.  Congress directed such commissioners, once appointed, to 
classify—based on personal examinations and the taking of  
affidavits—lands within the limits of the Northern Pacific grant as to their 
mineral character.  Further, Congress showed real urgency in providing 
actual money to fund the enterprise and in directing the commissioners to 
begin immediately upon their appointment.103  There would be no waiting 
for the Northern Pacific to file its selection lists. 
3. The Problem of Possession (for Subsequent Purchasers) 
Purchasers of land from the railroads also faced legal obstacles in an 
uncertain legal environment.  Railroad companies typically sold land by 
contracts under which several years might pass before actual titles changed 
hands.  Under American law at the time, this posed a problem; namely, that 
to maintain an ejectment suit, persons were required to show that they had 
“a valuable and subsisting interest and immediate right to the 
possession.”104  Because persons under contract to purchase lands from the 
railroad did not receive title until fulfilling the terms of their contract, they 
arguably lacked the “immediate right to possession” necessary to exercise 
any exclusionary right in court. 
 
103.  Act of Feb. 26, 1895, 28 Stat. 683. 
104.  Letter from Gose & Kuykendall to Stephens (March 1902), Northern Pacific Railway 
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John H. Jackson encountered this issue.  On Christmas Eve 1898, 
Jackson contracted for the purchase of Northern Pacific land in southeast 
Washington near the town of Pomeroy.105  Almost four years later, he 
sought to eject someone from the property who had been occupying it with 
a claim of ownership, but he could not do so because his contract with the 
Northern Pacific, like all others, was silent as to possession.  Accordingly, 
his attorneys from Pomeroy wrote to the railroad’s land department 
requesting that a company official sign a document confirming that the 
contract indeed entitled Jackson to possession of the land from the date of 
its execution.106  Assistant Land Commissioner F. W. Wilsey refused, 
stating his understanding that the railroad did not in fact “place purchasers 
of its lands in possession thereof,” but rather made possession contingent 
upon all of the conditions included in the contracts.107  He thus advised the 
attorneys to take the matter up with the company’s division counsel in 
Spokane, H. M. Stephens.  They did just that.108  Luckily for Jackson, 
Stephens disagreed with Wilsey’s interpretation and did not object to 
signing the instrument attached.  He forwarded the letter to Kerr to confirm, 
and Kerr agreed. Kerr then asked Land Commissioner Phipps to sign the 
instrument.109  At least one problem was solved. 
4. The “Problem” of the Duty to Exclude 
In some instances, railroad attorneys sought to maintain some level of 
legal uncertainty, lest issues be resolved against their client’s interests.  One 
example of this phenomenon dealt with the doctrine of adverse possession.  
This doctrine holds that where a deed holder allows another to possess its 
land in an actual, hostile, exclusive, and continuous fashion, under a claim 
of right, and for some requisite period, the deed holder loses the right to 
eject the trespasser.110  It is, in essence, a duty of exclusion. Given that the 
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Northern Pacific acquired its interest in lands over several steps, with 
arguably increased property rights at each step, questions were raised, even 
as late as the turn of the century, as to the time at which the Northern 
Pacific’s duty to exclude adverse uses of its lands attached.  This was of 
concern not just to the Northern Pacific, but also those who purchased or 
were considering purchasing lands from the company. 
One such case involved Miles J. Cavanaugh, a miner and a member of 
the Mineral Land Classification Commission for the district encompassing 
Butte.  In the summer of 1899, Cavanaugh purchased a section of land just 
to the west of Butte near the mining town of Anaconda, a section he and the 
commission had classified as non-mineral in a report approved by the 
Commissioner of the GLO the previous summer.111  Prior to Cavanaugh’s 
purchase of the property, however, a portion of it—the northeastern  
part—had reportedly been enclosed by a fence by someone with the last 
name Hays, and before that by someone with the last name McCleary, as 
part of what locals knew as the Saw Mill Ranch.112 
Early in the spring following his purchase, Cavanaugh began to remove 
the fence before receiving a complaint from Hays claiming the tract as his 
own.  Hays sought an ejectment of Cavanaugh and his employees, accusing 
them of having, “without right, unlawfully and without the consent of the 
plaintiff, entered upon said premises and trespassed thereon.”113  “Unless 
restrained by the order of this Court,” the defendants would, according to 
Hays, 
enter upon the same and tear down, take away and destroy 
plaintiff’s fence enclosing said premises, and may themselves, 
their servants, agencys and employes [sic], continually enter and 
trespass upon said premises and destroy the said grass and hay, 
and will allow stock and cattle to enter and trespass upon the same, 
and that if they are permitted to remove or break or tear down or 
destroy said fence of any portion thereof, stock and cattle will 
continually enter upon the same and tread down said grass and 
render said premises worthless to the plaintiff for the purpose of 
raising grass or hay thereon.114 
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Neither Hays nor McCleary had received patent from the United States, 
neither claimed to have purchased the land from the Northern Pacific, 
which had received a patent, and neither claimed to have rights under the 
land settlement laws of the United States. Rather, Hays based his claim on 
the doctrine of adverse possession. 
A Butte law firm of Miles J. Cavanaugh Jr., the defendant’s son, and 
Edward W. Beattie, Jr., the surveyor general’s son, represented 
Cavanaugh.115  In March 1900, after a judge had ordered a preliminary 
injunction against Cavanaugh entering the premises and had scheduled a 
court date for trial, the firm wrote to the Northern Pacific’s division 
counsel, William Wallace, asking for information and for other assistance in 
the defense.  The question was important enough for Wallace to forward it 
to Assistant General Counsel James B. Kerr.  Wallace summarized the 
plaintiff’s claim as relying upon “the proposition that the statutes of 
limitation begin to run on the definite location of the line and the fixing of 
the grant.”116  He also predicted what authority plaintiff’s attorneys would 
use as support, all cases from California.117 
Wallace initially thought that the Supreme Court had settled this 
question in an 1889 case.118  In that case, the Court held that “[w]hile the 
title to public land is still in the United States, no adverse possession of it 
can, under a statute of limitations, confer a title which will prevail in an 
action of ejectment in the courts of the United States against the legal title 
under a patent from the United States.”119  He was surprised to have found, 
however, that he was unable to locate another similar holding in his 
“hurried examination.”120  He hoped that Kerr might have access to some 
such decisions “where you can lay your hands on them,” and asked Kerr to 
“furnish me with them by return mail.”121 
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Kerr had no definitive answer.  As he characterized it, Wallace’s 
question was “a very difficult one.”122  He cited to one case, from just a few 
years earlier, that he thought could potentially support a claim that the 
statute of limitations had not begun to run until mineral classification.  In 
that case, Michigan Lumber Co. v. Rust, the Supreme Court held that legal 
title did not pass under the Swamp Land Grant Act until lands were 
determined to be swamp.123  Since the Northern Pacific only received title 
to lands determined to be non-mineral under the Mineral Classification Act, 
he thought the case could be analogous, though he acknowledged “not 
[being] satisfied that the case falls within the doctrine of [that Supreme 
Court opinion].124 
As to whether the Northern Pacific should aid in Cavanaugh’s defense, 
Kerr answered in the negative.  He reasoned that the issue was “such a 
dangerous one that it seems to me it is better to have it undecided than 
decided adversely and the common understanding is likely to be that the 
statute did not begin to run until the issuance of patent.”125  In other words, 
the common understanding was better for the railroad than the great weight 
of precedent, and it was best not to risk alerting potential adverse 
claimants—as well as the attorneys representing them—to that fact. 
Even as Kerr thought it best for the Northern Pacific not to be directly 
involved in the lawsuit, he urged Wallace to make it clear that “the 
company stands ready at any time to refund to Mr. Cavanaugh the whole or 
such portion of the purchase price as he is entitled to receive,” especially 
since the portion of land involved is small.126  Kerr also wrote to attorneys 
Beattie and Cavanaugh directly to offer them some legal advice.  In 
particular, he recommended “a strong effort . . . be made to show that the 
nature of the possession of McCleary and Hays was not such a nature as to 
come within the statute.”  He also summarized his understanding of the law 
regarding when the statute of limitations began to run.  After recounting 
that the Supreme Court’s prior decisions had “uniformly been to the effect 
that on definite location the full legal and beneficial title to land in the place 
limits passed to the company,” he surmised that the Mineral Classification 
Act may cast some doubt upon that issue, again citing to Michigan Lumber 
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Co. v. Rust. Kerr hoped such “authority may be of some assistance to 
[Beattie and Cavanaugh].”127 
The Northern Pacific’s legal department encountered the same issue a 
few years later in 1903, and the issue’s resolution remained uncertain.  One 
party, E.C. Pace, from Whitehall, Montana, wrote to Assistant Land 
Commissioner Wilsey asking two deceptively simple questions:  (1) does 
the statute of limitations run against the Northern Pacific as it does against 
an individual, and (2) does it begin to run on the date of patent issuance, on 
the date of definite location, or on the date of filing of maps of definite 
location with the land office?  Pace also desired any Supreme Court 
opinions on the issue.128  Wilsey forwarded the letter to Land Attorney J. B. 
McNamee, who replied to Pace that his questions “cover so much ground 
that a complete answer to them would be equivalent to writing a brief on 
the subject.”  Moreover, McNamee claimed that such a brief “would be 
unsatisfactory to [Pace] because of the impossibility of foreseeing just how 
the question will arise as to a given tract of land.”  Like Kerr, he did not 
want “to pass on the general question, as the answer might prove 
misleading.”129 
IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CHANGES COURSE 
Railroads also contributed to the avoidance of tragedy by making it so 
that policymakers could no longer ignore the problem.  By accelerating the 
demand for timber and other resources, railroads sparked concerns about 
timber famine, thereby precipitating a paradigm shift in how the 
government approached both its forests and its public domain more broadly.  
First, in the 1880s, the GLO began to police the public domain much more 
aggressively, including against trespasses.  Then, in the 1890s, Congress 
shifted policies from one of disposing of its lands as quickly as possible to 
retaining and centrally managing certain lands—including the best 
remaining forests—in perpetuity. 
A. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 
A major shift in the GLO’s stance towards land and timber 
depredations occurred after the election of Grover Cleveland to the 
presidency in 1884.  During his campaign, Cleveland had specifically 
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argued for reforms in the GLO to address its acquiescence to rampant 
frauds and timber poaching.  Upon assuming office, he appointed Lamar as 
secretary of Interior and Sparks as commissioner of the GLO, both of whom 
already garnered reputations as land reformers.  Their appointments spelled 
trouble for the lumber interests that had grown dependent upon “free 
timber” from the public domain.  The administration’s stated policies even 
caused Hammond, a fervent Democrat, to switch party allegiances.130 
As head of the GLO, Sparks confirmed Hammond’s worst fears.  
While he was not the first head of the GLO to seek to clean up the office’s 
administration of the public domain, Sparks was more aggressive—and, 
hence, more successful—than any of his predecessors.  Most notably, he 
effected a major shift in the GLO’s approach to timber depredations.  When 
he first arrived at his post, he found not just a gross indifference among land 
officials in the government to protecting the public domain, but actually a 
firm belief that the administration lacked the legal authority to prevent or 
punish depredations at all.  Sparks lamented in his first annual report to 
Congress in 1885:  “It seems that the prevailing idea running through this 
office . . . was that the government had no distinctive rights to be 
considered and no special interests to protect . . . .”131  Notions of “free 
land” and “free timber” not only pervaded communities of “looters,”132 but 
they also influenced those standing guard at the gates. 
Sparks committed resources to investigating and prosecuting timber 
trespasses.  Within his first year, he sent over twenty special agents to 
Washington to investigate over a thousand cases of timber trespass 
involving the alleged theft of timber worth more than nine million dollars.  
This was not just for show, as such investigations led to prosecutions by the 
following year.133  Sparks did not just go after minor offenders.  In July of 
1885, he filed suit against the Northern Pacific and Hammond’s Montana 
Improvement Company for their illegal cutting of federal timber in western 
Montana.134  Unfortunately, this prosecution would demarcate the limits of 
Sparks’ power.  In defense, Hammond and other officials claimed that they 
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only took timber from railroad lands—i.e., odd sections—but this seems 
implausible given that much of the land remained unsurveyed.  They also 
claimed that the previous administration, including Secretary of Interior 
Henry Teller, had authorized their activities.135  That argument seems 
believable, given the laxity of the previous administration’s protection of 
the federal domain.  Regardless of the merits of the government’s case and 
the companies’ defenses, Hammond won victories outside the courtroom. 
For example, he was able to rally local support by temporarily closing down 
mills and blaming the closures on the government’s suits.136  By the fall of 
1886, Sparks had found that it would be difficult to secure witnesses to 
testify against the companies, and by 1887, Sparks ran out of money and 
had to suspend the investigation.137  This gave Hammond and the other 
officials in the Montana Improvement Company an opportunity to insulate 
themselves legally from further prosecution.138 
From the start, Sparks also committed himself to cleaning up land 
office operations, including addressing the rampant frauds that had long 
been a feature of public lands administration.  The Timber and Stone Act, 
which Congress passed in 1878, seemed to invite more fraudulent entries 
than any past legislation.  That law provided for the sale of California, 
Oregon, Nevada, and Washington “timberlands”—defined as lands 
“valuable chiefly for timber, but unfit for cultivation”—in 160-acre tracts 
for $2.50 per acre.139  Each applicant had to submit an affidavit declaring, 
under oath, that the land was primarily valuable for timber, unimproved, 
and unfit for cultivation; that the applicant had not previously applied for 
land under the act; that the application was not for speculative purposes but 
rather “in good faith to appropriate it to his own exclusive use and benefit”; 
and that the applicant had not agreed to sell the title to another person or 
company.140  In truth, timber companies routinely paid dummy locators to 
file applications under the act with the understanding, if not explicit written 
agreements, that they would convey the lands to the companies upon 
receiving title.141  Indeed, Sparks investigated 2,591 entries made pursuant 
to the Act and found 2,223 of them—over eighty-five percent—to have 
been fraudulent.142  In response, in 1886, Sparks suspended all entries under 
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the Timber and Stone Act and most entries under other land laws in the 
western states and territories, where frauds were most prevalent.  In 
defending his extreme actions, he bluntly pointed to the fact that the “public 
domain was being made the prey of unscrupulous speculation and the worst 
forms of land monopoly through systematic frauds.”143 
Sparks was so aggressive that one Montana paper, in 1885, suggested 
that Sparks had preservationist motives.  It wrote: 
Sparks must be of the opinion that timber is one of the most sacred 
products of nature, not to be defiled by the rude hand of man but 
intended by God to grow and die and rot, safe from the profanation 
of the axeman’s stroke, and that it were sacrilegious to use it for 
fuel, building or mining purposes.144  
In the West in the 1880s, there was perhaps no greater insult.  Though there 
is no evidence that Sparks in fact cared about nature per se, his goals 
aligned with those of an emerging conservationist movement, the very 
movement to which the Montana newspaper sought to link the 
commissioner.  Beginning in the 1860s, the acceleration in the exploitation 
of natural resources, including timber, contributed to a growing awareness 
in the United States and elsewhere of the scarcity of resources and of the 
need for some sort of rational management of their use.  What came to be 
known as the conservation movement had many strands:  some sought to 
ensure a broad segment of the population had access to resources, some 
sought to ensure a resource base for future generations, some sought to 
preserve the watershed-protection functions of certain forests, particularly 
those in the mountains, some sought to protect certain areas for their 
aesthetic or recreation value, and yes, some—albeit a far smaller  
number—sought to protect nature for nature’s sake.  Each of these 
“conservationist” goals were impossible to achieve given the broken land 
law system and the rampant fraud and theft of public resources, the same 
problems Sparks aggressively confronted for his own reasons. 
B. STATUTORY REFORM OF PUBLIC LAND LAWS 
Sparks’ term as head of the GLO set the stage for great conservationist 
victories in Congress in the 1890s.  In response to the perceived waste and 
destruction of the nation’s forests, as well as the anticipated threat of a 
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timber famine, Congress, in 1891, passed what Gifford Pinchot later called 
“the most important legislation in the history of Forestry in America.”145  In 
the legislation that came to be known as “the Forest Reserve Act,” Congress 
authorized the president to “[s]et apart and reserve . . . public land bearing 
forests . . . or in part covered by timber or undergrowth, whether of 
commercial value or not, as public reservations . . . .”146  Pinchot was not 
alone in forestry circles in his praise of the Act, which many saw as the first 
step towards protecting public timberlands from waste and depredations.147  
Soon after it was passed, GLO Commissioner Thomas H. Carter predicted 
the Act would “do much in the way of caring for portions of the public 
lands bearing forest which it is needful to preserve from spoliation.”148  In 
his report to Congress a few months later, Secretary of the Interior John 
Noble concurred.  He noted that if the law were “prosecuted systematically 
and thoroughly, posterity will look upon the action as that to which the 
country owes much of its prosperity and safety.”149  Notably, the 
legislation—one of the first calling for the conservation or protection of 
resources—did not call for any sort of management, but rather was one 
simply of excluding others from designated reserves. 
Despite the enthusiasm for the Act in the Department of Interior, 
Secretary of Interior John W. Noble initially advised that the government 
withdraw only those forests “not absolutely required for the legitimate use 
and necessities of the residents,” the promotion of settlement, or the 
development of natural resources in the immediate vicinity.150  Still, in the 
next two years, President Benjamin Harrison, a Republican, designated 
fifteen reserves encompassing over thirteen million acres.151  In addition, 
while Noble took a conservative view of the qualification of lands for 
inclusion in the reserve system, he took a liberal view of what activities 
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were prohibited within the reserves, namely all commercial activities.  This 
interpretation received great applause from those who had advocated for 
forest reserves for aesthetic, preservationist reasons. 
Noble’s commitment not to reserve lands desirable for settlement or 
development may have been a ploy to gain favor—or at least minimize 
dissent—amongst the public.  However, it may also have had to do with the 
simple fact that neither the GLO, nor the Department of Interior of which it 
was a part, had the capacity to enforce the Act’s provisions even to the 
lands that still qualified for reservation.  While Congress passed legislation 
calling for the GLO to exclude others from forest reserves, it failed to 
provide any money for the GLO to implement Congress’ directive.  The 
GLO, already overworked, simply lacked the workforce to take on this new 
task.  It not only had too few special agents to monitor the reserves, but 
these agents also had many other responsibilities, a combination that led to 
them only giving “cursory attention” to the reserves.152  In 1893, after 
legislators ignored his request for the establishment of a new corps to 
supervise the reserves, Secretary of Interior Hoke Smith complained that 
the reserves were no better protected than unappropriated, unreserved 
lands.153  Smith was right; at the time, the GLO employed only eighty-two 
part-time special agents to investigate frauds, timber depredations, illegal 
fencing, and other transgressions over the entire public domain consisting 
of not just the thirteen million acres of forest reserves, but the entire public 
domain exceeding over five-hundred million acres.154  Accordingly, the 
secretary determined no new reservations should be created until Congress 
gave them the means—both financial and legal—to protect and manage 
such reservations.155 
In 1894, Smith promulgated regulations calling for the prosecution of 
trespasses within the reserves.156  However, Smith still encountered the 
same issues as his predecessors:  a lack of enforcement power.  The 
regulations made Smith unpopular in the West.  Even the relatively few 
prosecutions that Smith instituted were enough to lead western stock and 
timber interests to push Congress to open reservations to resource use and 
extraction.  They also led to legal challenges regarding the validity of the 
regulations.  In one notable case, ranchers in Oregon insisted the regulation 
violated their fundamental rights of open access to the range resource, as 
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well as every other resource, on public lands.  The circuit court disagreed, 
finding there was “‘no implication of a license to use the [forest reserves] to 
the destruction or injury of these forests,’ and reiterated the judicial doctrine 
that the federal government had the right to protect its interests against the 
threat of trespass and injury.”157  This opinion sparked outrage amongst 
cattlemen. 
With the government’s right of exclusion legally vindicated, a grand 
compromise became feasible.  Nobody wanted the reserved forests to go 
completely unused, while government officials in the GLO and Interior 
recognized a complete ban on entry would be impossible to enforce.  In 
early 1896, Smith recognized the opportunity to enact a real management 
system for federal timberlands, and he asked the National Academy of 
Sciences to appoint a commission to study and to advise on the use and 
management of the reserves.  In his letter to the academy, he exhibited a 
sense of urgency, in part due to the time already wasted: 
My predecessors in office for the last twenty years have vainly 
called attention to the inadequacy and confusion of existing laws 
relating to the public timber lands and consequent absence of an 
intelligent policy in their administration, resulting in such 
conditions as may, if not speedily stopped, prevent a proper 
development of a large portion of our country; and because the evil 
grows more and more as the years go by, I am impelled to 
emphasize the importance of the question by calling upon you for 
the opinion and advice of that body of scientists which is officially 
empowered to act in such cases as this.158 
Smith requested the academy issue the report during that session of 
Congress.159  Nearly one year later, at the end of Cleveland’s term, the 
committee’s work remained incomplete.  However, prior to Cleveland 
leaving office, the commission made oral recommendations to Smith’s 
successor, Secretary David R. Francis.  The oral recommendations included 
the establishment of thirteen new reserves encompassing twenty-one 
million acres. Cleveland agreed with this recommendation and decided to 
issue the order creating the reserves on February 22, George Washington’s 
birthday.  If the intent was to link forest reserves with the proud American 
tradition of representative democracy, it failed.  Indeed, echoing Senator 
Benton’s statement from decades earlier linking restrictions on access to 
 
157.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Tygh Valley Land and Livestock 
Co., 76 F. 693, 695 (1876)). 
158.  See S. Doc. No. 105, at 7 (1897). 
159.  STEEN, supra note 151, at 31. 
         
2014] NO TRESPASSING 119 
public resources to monarchism, the Seattle Chamber of Commerce 
represented a large segment of Western opposition when it complained 
bitterly that even “King George had never attempted so high-handed an 
invasion upon [Americans’] rights.”160  Laws can change, but customs die 
hard. 
Even with strong resistance remaining, Cleveland’s action signaled that 
the era of free land and free timber was over, at least as applied to the 
remaining federal timberlands.  Thus, when President William McKinley 
submitted the committee’s full report to Congress in May of 1897, there 
was ample support for a compromise measure that would recognize federal 
authority over its timberlands while still allowing for use to meet the 
existing resource needs of local communities.  Within a month, Congress 
passed a bill providing for the management of federal timberlands to sustain 
the timber resource and to provide watershed protection, while allowing for 
timber cutting, mining, and livestock grazing—just the privilege westerners 
claimed to possess, though it would no longer be unrestrained or free.161 
V. CONCLUSION 
Railroad companies were primary beneficiaries of the federal 
government’s nineteenth-century policy preference favoring the rapid 
disposal of its public domain, for the most part at prices far below market 
value, if not for free.  Beyond its massive land giveaways, the federal 
government also exhibited an indifference to protecting its public domain 
for as long as lands remained public.  Railroad companies—or, more 
accurately, their officials and employees—benefitted from that laxity as 
well. 
However, railroad land grant recipients also played a key role in 
bringing this policy preference to an end.  Because these companies had 
both a pecuniary interest in protecting their lands from trespasses and theft 
and the means to police their massive land holdings, as well as neighboring 
federal lands, they confronted and challenged a frontier custom treating all 
public resources as free for the taking in ways that the federal government 
failed to do.  At the same time, because railroads accelerated the rate of 
resource exploitation, it also awakened the public to the perils of unfettered 
degradation of the nation’s resource base to such a degree that government 
officials could no longer ignore the need to reform its land policies.  The 
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model of conservation embodied in the Forest Management Act, which still 
governs management of the national forests, required not only planning and 
restraint on the part of the government, but also the willingness and ability 
to exclude others from exploiting the land’s resources.  In this regard, 
railroads showed the way, even if most policymakers and government 
officials were slow to see it. 
Still, by the late nineteenth century, the customs of free land, free 
minerals, and free timber had become too entrenched to be fully eradicated.  
And the divergence between federal policies as promulgated, federal 
policies as enforced, and local informal legal regimes—of which this 
article’s story is a prime example—would continue to influence and 
constrain land management well into the next century.162  Westerners 
continued to expect timber to be readily available to them, even if under a 
federal management regime.  This helps to explain why logging came to 
dominate the management of our national forests.  This may not be a 
tragedy, but it is unfortunate.  Lessons abound for us as we confront new 
challenges today. Hopefully, we will not be too slow in seeing them.  
Merely avoiding tragedy is not always good enough. 
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